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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
DANNY L. PIERCE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 880346-CA 
Priority No. 2 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Danny L. Pierce, was charged with presenting a 
false or fraudulent insurance claim, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-521 (1978). 
Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the charge and was 
found guilty by a jury on February 22, 1988. Defendant filed an 
appeal raising four issues to the Utah Court of Appeals. Upon 
review, the Court found defendant's appeal meritorious reversing 
the trial court's decision. The case was remanded for a new trial 
with instructions to the trial court as to how to approach the 
statute of limitations issue. The State now seeks clarification 
of the instructions set forth in the appellate opinion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in appellant's brief and are 
restated in the Court's opinion. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is some question as to what the trial court's 
responsibility is when the case is heard on remand. The issue 
which should be addressed and clarified is the manner in which 
the trial court should approach the statute of limitation issue. 
This Court should clarify the approach because the method of the 
California courts, the authorities relied upon in the Court's 
opinion. The California courts treat legal issues such as 
defective informations as matters of law for the trial court to 
rule upon and factual issues as matters for the jury to 
determine. The defective information or pleading statute of 
limitation issue is treated differently in California than in 
Utah and the cases cited by this Court tend to involve the 
defective pleading problem and could be confusing to the trial 
court and attorneys involved. 
INTRODUCTION 
A classic pleading problem is raised in In re Demillo, 14 
Cal 3d 598, 535 P. 2d 1181, 121 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1975). In that 
case the defendant plead guilty to an information. The 
information was silent as to when the offense was committed. It 
was also silent as to the fact that the defendant had been 
outside the state for the critical statute of limitations period. 
The defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus attacking the 
jurisdiction of the trial court. The California appellate court 
held that the accusatory pleading must allege facts showing that 
the prosecution is not barred by the statute of limitations. In 
the absence of such an allegation in the information, the court 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter and defendant was 
discharged. The case, People v. Padfield, 136 Cal. App. 3d 218, 
185 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1982) is similar. In Padfield the defendant 
entered a no contest plea after initially resisting the charge by 
proceeding to trial. During trial the defendant's counsel 
belatedly discovered that the defendant's out of state absence 
tolled the statute of limitations. The defendant then hastily 
changed his plea pursuant to a plea bargain. The trial court 
addressed the statute of limitations issue with the defendant at 
the time of his plea. The defendant persisted in his plea and 
later attempted to raise the statute of limitation issue on 
appeal. The appellate court rejected the defendant's attack 
noting that the defendant's plea acknowledged each and every 
element of the offense. Notwithstanding the defendant's attempt 
to make his case similar to Demillo, the appellate court was not 
persuaded. The case did not present the same issues, but did give 
the court an opportunity to discourse on the approach the 
California courts take with respect to the statute of limitations 
issue. This Court has taken a different approach to the defective 
information problem as evidenced by the first portion of its 
opinion in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION REQUIREMENT IS 
A JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT. 
Statutes of limitation are legislative creations which limit 
the power of the State to initiate prosecutions. The statute of 
limitation is not an element of the offense. State v. Tibor, 373 
N.W.2d 877 (N.D. 1985). Utah's statute of limitation on criminal 
offenses is no exception. It is a legislative proscription on the 
right to prosecute. It serves the purpose of encouraging the 
State to bring charges in a timely manner and protects the 
individual from stale prosecutions. As this court has ruled, the 
State bears the burden of proving the facts to support its claim 
that the statute of limitation has been complied with in any 
given case. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD REVIEW DEFENDANT'S REQUEST 
TO DETERMINE IF IT PRESENTS A QUESTION OF FACT. 
A statute of limitations issue may present an issue of law 
or may present a factual issue. Where an issue of law is 
presented, a trial court may rule upon the issue. Where a 
question of fact is presented, then the prevailing rule suggests 
that a jury must rule as to whether the prosecution was initiated 
during the appropriate period. State v. Wyman, 198 Kan. 666, 426 
p. 2d 26 (Kan. 1967); Criminal Law, Section 1132, 23A C.J.S. 
(1968). A typical legal issue is the defective pleading issue 
raised in Demillo. 
When a defendant raises a statute of limitation question, 
the trial court should first determine if the question raised by 
the accused presents a question of law or a question of fact. If 
the matter is one of law, the trial court may rule upon the 
issue. However, if the defendant has raised an issue which 
involves a factual dispute, such as the one presented in this 
case, then the trial court should submit the matter to the jury 
for its determination. The previous approach taken by the trial 
court in this case should be avoided. The trial court should not 
take evidence to attempt to resolve factual disputes as to 
whether the a particular crime was discovered when the trier of 
fact i.e. the jury may reach different conclusions on the 
evidence. Typical of questions that ought to be submitted to a 
jury are issues involving discovery of the offense and tolling of 
statute of limitation. 
The State argues that a "standard" needs to be adopted for 
determining when a question of needs be submitted to a jury. No 
standard need be adopted. The State's example is an attempt to 
allow the trial court to adjudicate facts which it should submit 
to a jury by placing a conclusionary labeling test on the facts. 
(See addendum note.) If any test should be applied, it should be 
a test similar to that of summary judgment. If there is genuine 
issue with respect to a factual question, then the matter ought 
to be submitted to the jury. 
The trial court should apply a preponderance of evidence 
standard upon those issues requiring its decision. The jury 
should apply its traditional standard of beyond a reasonable 
doubt on matters that are submitted to it for findings. As noted 
in the respondent's brief, the "some evidence" standard is 
inappropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court should first determine whether an issue of 
law or fact is presented when the defendant raises a statute of 
limitations issue. If the issue is one of law, then the trial 
court should proceed to deal with the issue and apply the 
preponderance of the evidence standard. If the issue involves 
facts, such as the discovery question in this case, then the 
trial court should require the matter to be presented to the 
jury. The jury would apply its traditional standard with respect 
to the evidence• 
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ADDENDUM 
Without a presentation of the underlying facts, one cannot 
arrive at the conclusion that "discovery" is equal to "mere 
suspicion." See Turner v. Liner, 87 P. 2d 740, 742 (Cal. App. 
1939). This case clearly indicates the need for a court to hear 
the underlying facts as evidence^ by this quotation: 
"Discovery" and "knowledge" are not convertible terms, 
and whether there has been a "discovery" of the facts 
"constituting the fraud" within the statute of 
limitations, is a question of law to be determined by 
the court from the facts pleaded. As in the case of 
any other legal conclusion, it is not sufficient to 
make averment thereof, but the facts from which the 
conclusion follows must themselves be pleaded. It is 
not enough that plaintiff merely avers that he was 
ignorant of the facts at the time of the occurrence, 
has not been informed of them until within the three 
years. He must show that the acts of fraud were 
committed under such circumstances that he would not be 
presumed to have any knowledge of them—as that they 
were done in secret or were kept concealed; and he must 
show that the times and circumstances under which the 
facts constituting the fraud were brought to his 
knowledge, so that the court may determine whether 
discovery of these facts was within the time alleged, 
and the means of knowledge are equivalent to knowledge, 
if it appears that the plaintiff had notice or 
information of the circumstances which would put him on 
an inquiry which if followed, would lead to knowledge, 
or that the facts were presumptively within the 
knowledge he will be deemed to have had actual 
knowledge of these facts. These principles are so 
fully recognized that mere reference to some of the 
cases in which they have been reinforced will be 
sufficient. (Citations omitted). Turner v. Liner. 87 
P.2d at 742. 
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